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A B S T R A C T   
Concerns have been raised about the low reliability of measurements of spatial attentional bias via RT differences 
in dot-probe tasks. The anticipatory form of the bias, directed towards predicted future stimuli, appears to have 
relatively good reliability, reaching around 0.70. However, studies thus far have not attempted to experimentally 
control task-related influence on bias, which could further improve reliability. Evoking top-down versus bottom- 
up conflict may furthermore reveal associations with individual differences related to mental health. In the 
current study, a sample of 143 participants performed a predictive Visual Probe Task (predVPT) with angry and 
neutral face stimuli online. In this task, an automatic bias is induced via visually neutral cues that predict the 
location of an upcoming angry face. A task-relevant bias was induced via blockwise shifts in the likely location of 
target stimuli. The bias score resulting from these factors was calculated as RTs to target stimuli at locations of 
predicted but not actually presented angry versus neutral faces. Correlations were tested with anxiety, depres-
sion, self-esteem and aggression scales. An overall bias towards threat was found with a split-half reliability of 
0.90, and 0.89 after outlier removal. Avoidance of threat in blocks with a task-relevant bias away from threat was 
correlated with anxiety, with correction for multiple testing. The same relationship was nominally significant for 
depression and low self-esteem. In conclusion, we showed high reliability of spatial attentional bias that was 
related to anxiety.   
1. Introduction 
When confronted with multiple stimuli that could evoke a response, 
but to which only some can be responded at a time, selective attention is 
required to select particular stimuli for further processing (Carrasco, 
2011). This kind of attention can be modelled in computational terms 
using saliency maps (Soltani & Koch, 2010; Treue, 2003). Salience is 
determined by interactions between endogenous attention, i.e., volun-
tary, controlled, goal-dependent “top-down” attentional processes, and 
exogenous attention, i.e., reflexive, automatic, stimulus-driven “bottom- 
up” attentional processes (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Posner, 1980; 
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Van der Stigchel 
et al., 2009). Importantly, automatic influences on attention have been 
expanded from basic visual stimulus features to include emotional or 
motivational features (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Niu et al., 2012). For 
example, stimuli with high relevance for survival such as snakes or 
spiders attract visual attention more than neutral stimuli such as flowers 
or mushrooms (Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Öhman et al., 2001; Rinck & 
Becker, 2006); positive stimuli also attract visual attention more than 
neutral stimuli, although possibly to a lesser extent than negative stimuli 
(Stefanics et al., 2012). Emotion-related biases in spatial attention 
allocation are commonly assessed by the dot-probe task (MacLeod et al., 
1986; Mogg & Bradley, 1999). The dot-probe task is a two-choice de-
cision task in which spatial attention is hypothesized to be automatically 
shifted by pairs of salient and neutral task-irrelevant probes that alter 
the reaction time to task-relevant stimuli. Probe stimuli are presented at 
the locations of either the salient or the neutral cue stimuli. The reaction 
time difference between the probe-on-salient trials and probe-on-neutral 
trials provides a quantification of attentional bias towards or away from 
the salient cue stimuli. Attentional bias towards or away from salient 
cues have been linked to an array of mental health problems (Cisler & 
Koster, 2010; Dalgleish et al., 2010). For example, bias towards threat is 
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associated with anxiety disorders (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Kos-
ter, 2010), and post-traumatic stress disorder (Naim et al., 2014), bias 
towards negative information is related to depression (Peckham et al., 
2010), bias towards rejection predicts self-esteem vulnerabilities (Rav-
ary & Baldwin, 2018), bias towards social threat is linked to hostile 
intent attribution in children (Miller & Johnston, 2019), and a bias to-
wards aggression-related cues was observed in a sample of intimate 
partner aggression perpetrators with problematic alcohol use (Massa 
et al., 2019). Positive visual attentional bias has been shown to aid 
emotion regulation in stressful situations (Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 
2008). However, it is statistically necessary for the detection of re-
lationships involving individual differences that the used measures are 
reliable, and recent studies have shown that the dot-probe task has very 
poor reliability (e.g., Ataya et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2014; Chapman 
et al., 2019; Cooper et al., 2011; Dear et al., 2011; Kappenman et al., 
2014; Waechter & Stolz, 2015). Further, clinically anxious individuals 
were not found to have the expected bias towards threat in a meta- 
analysis of baseline measurements in studies aimed at tests of Atten-
tional Bias Modification (Kruijt et al., 2019). It is thus uncertain which of 
the many interesting, sometimes complex results in the dot-probe 
literature reflect true effects, as it seems likely at least some propor-
tion must involve false positives given a noisy bias measure. Results may 
need to be (re-)gathered using attentional bias measures with improved 
psychometric properties for the field to move forward. 
The predictive version of the Visual Probe Task, predVPT (Gladwin, 
2016; Gladwin & Vink, 2018), may aid in this endeavour; the task was 
originally termed the “cued” VPT, cVPT, which has previously been 
suggested to be changed to the conceptually clearer term used here 
(Gladwin & Vink, 2020). The task was originally designed to help 
measure attentional bias variability by removing undesirable sources of 
trial-to-trial variability, but this removal of noise may also improve split- 
half reliability. During the predVPT, pictorial and probe trials are 
selected at random throughout the task (Fig. 1). In the pictorial trials, 
two visually neutral predictive cues consistently predict the locations of 
subsequent salient and control stimuli (e.g., angry vs neutral facial ex-
pressions). This is intended to evoke automatic anticipatory processing 
that can bias spatial selective attention. The bias is assessed by the 
performance on probe trials. During these trials the predictor stimuli are 
presented but, instead of the pictorial stimuli, a probe consisting of a 
target and a distractor stimulus is presented that requires a response. 
The bias is thus assessed by RTs to targets at the location of predicted, 
but not actually presented, salient versus control stimuli. This avoids the 
bias on a given trial being dependent on the particular pair of stimuli 
selected from the salient and control categories – a participant may well 
have varying responses to particular exemplars, resulting in noisy data. 
Threat-related bias measures via the predVPT indeed showed relatively 
good split-half reliability compared to an equivalent dot-probe task 
(Gladwin, Möbius, Mcloughlin, & Tyndall, 2019); when the task design 
was optimized and trial numbers were increased, reliability reached 
psychometrically adequate levels for both threat-related bias, 0.70 
(Gladwin & Vink, 2020) and alcohol-related bias, 0.74 (Gladwin, 2019). 
Further studies addressed the concern that systematic between-subject 
variance associated with individual differences related to the visual 
characteristics of the predictive cues might account for the high reli-
ability (Gladwin et al., 2020; Gladwin, Figner, & Vink, 2019). An 
attentional bias modification training study using a training variant of 
the predVPT supported the interpretation that the bias involved antici-
patory processes rather than merely conditioning of the initially neutral 
cues (Gladwin, Möbius, & Becker, 2019). 
We note that the idea of an “anticipatory bias”, which does not 
depend on the kind of stimulus-evoked response the traditional dot- 
probe task aims to measure, could perhaps be considered a theoretical 
oxymoron in terms of traditional dual-process models. We therefore 
briefly provide the rationale of this approach here. As more extensively 
discussed elsewhere, the core feature of these models is a controlled/ 
reflective versus automatic/impulsive distinction (Diederich & Zhao, 
2019; Kahneman, 2003; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Strack & Deutsch, 
2004), related to the intuitive sense that some parts of ourselves feel like 
they need to be kept under control, and other parts of ourselves need to 
do the controlling. Dual-process models describe this division in terms of 
the types of processing done by a reflective system versus an impulsive 
system. The reflective system consists of high-level cognitive functions 
that allow flexible, complex cognition and self-control, at the cost of 
being slow, effortful and error-prone; for instance, the manipulation of 
information in working memory, or the inhibition of a prepotent 
response. The impulsive system consists of lower-level functions that are 
simpler but fast, relying on previous learning experiences resulting in 
simple associations or immediate, “hard-wired” emotional responses; for 
instance, the quick classification of a half-seen shape as a spider or 
avoidance of painful stimuli. Although these models are very widely 
used, the claim that there is evidence for distinct systems or clearly 
separated sets of processes has been strongly criticized, as has the pre-
cision and adequacy of their theoretical constructs and terminology 
(Bellini-Leite, 2017; Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996; Grayot, 2020; Keren, 
2013; Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Osman, 
2004). In response to this, a variation of dual-process models was 
developed, the Reprocessing and Reinforcement model of Reflectivity, 
the R3 model (Gladwin et al., 2011; Gladwin & Figner, 2014; Wiers et al., 
2013). This was a proof-of-principle redefinition of reflective versus 
automatic processing defined in terms of a response evaluation and se-
lection cycle involving predicted outcomes, in which responses can 
include any kind of cognitive function (Dehaene & Changeux, 2000; 
Samejima et al., 2005; Samejima & Doya, 2007). A response evaluation 
and selection cycle can involve potentially multiple iterations of 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the task, using example stimuli from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces stimulus set (Lundqvist et al., 1988).  
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searching for and evaluating responses (Cunningham et al., 2007), 
which would strongly depend on temporal dynamics related to strengths 
of previously learned associations (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Dickinson 
& Balleine, 1995). A relatively reflective versus impulsive state of pro-
cessing in this model means that a relatively large amount of reproc-
essing is allowed for response evaluation and selection. This model 
explicitly merely draws together strands of existing knowledge and 
ideas, e.g., from cognitive neuroscience (Bunge, 2004) and neo- 
behaviorism (Day, 1969; Moore, 1996), that were considered to be 
especially relevant for the evolution of dual-process models. In so doing 
the model emphasizes four conceptual points: first, “top-down” pro-
cesses inherently depend on emotional and motivational processes that 
determine the goals such processes are used to achieve (Pessoa, 2009), 
and therefore these processes cannot be separated into separate systems; 
second, it is essential to avoid category mistakes by defining concepts at 
the correct level of emergence, in particular by distinguishing the more 
holistic state of reflectivity from specific component processes, any of 
which ultimately consists of obviously “automatic” information pro-
cessing at the neural level; third, that “control” can be a consequence of 
a parameter of a system, in particular time allotted to search, rather than 
necessitating a separate system (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011); and 
fourth, that executive functions, complex cognition and reflectivity are 
at least in part a consequence of reinforcement and learning history, in 
the same way as other behaviours (Day, 1969; Diamond et al., 2007; 
Hazy et al., 2007; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Park et al., 2010; Wang et al., 
2018), rather than a kind of “mental strength” or resource. While some 
views of dual-process models may consider automatic processes to be 
stimulus-driven and non-goal-directed by definition, the R3 model thus 
allows for a wide range of ways in which asymmetries in cognitive 
processes could bias the outcome of (cognitive) response selection. In 
particular, if the predicted outcome of shifting attention to one or 
another location is more versus less attractive or aversive, this could 
involuntarily affect the response selection process. The predVPT was 
generated from, and derives its rationale from, this theoretical 
framework. 
While the results of the predVPT are promising, previous studies 
have failed to control a particular task factor that may limit reliability 
and the ability to detect relationships with mental health: There has not 
been any attempt to experimentally control task-dependent influences 
on attention. In the traditional dot-probe task, there is no clear advan-
tage or disadvantage to shifting attention towards or away from any 
given stimulus category. It is possible that associations between threat- 
related bias and individual difference variables will only reveal them-
selves when there is a particular relationship, e.g., conflict, between 
task-relevant versus automatic processes effects on attention. The pre-
sent study therefore manipulated conflict between task-irrelevant 
emotional bias and the optimal direction of attention required by the 
task. The aim was to test whether this manipulation would (1) further 
improve the reliability of the predVPT, as the task-related component of 
attention would now be balanced rather than free to fluctuate per 
participant and (2) reveal, in exploratory analyses, associations with 
mental health-related individual differences in anxiety, depression, self- 
esteem, and aggression. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
The sample consisted of 146 healthy adult participants who enrolled 
for credit or a small monetary reward. Three participants were removed 
for having a low overall accuracy, below 0.8. In the sample for analysis 
there remained 98 female and 45 male participants, mean age 25, SD =
8.8. 
2.2. Materials 
2.2.1. Predictive Visual Probe Task (predVPT) 
The predVPT was programmed using JavaScript, PHP and HTML, 
and had the same trial structure as in previous work (Gladwin & Vink, 
2020). There were two trial types, randomly selected per trial: Picture 
and Probe trials. Both trial types started with 150, 200, or 250 ms 
(randomly selected with equal probability) of a fixation cross. Then 
predictive cues were presented for 400 ms, which were the symbols 
OOOOO and XXXXX. One of these (randomized per participant) was 
coloured yellow (RGB values 250, 250, 10) and the other light blue (RGB 
values 10, 250, 250). The cues were placed either in the top-left and 
bottom-right quadrant of the screen (one cue at each position, at 
random), or on the bottom-left and top-right quadrant of the screen; the 
used quadrants alternated per trial. From this point on, the two trial 
types diverged. On Picture trials, one of the cues was replaced by an 
angry face, and the other by a neutral face; which cue was followed by 
which expression was consistent within each participant and random-
ized over participants. Faces were drawn from 36 faces of the Karolinska 
Directed Emotional Faces set (Lundqvist et al., 1988). Pictures were 
shown for 1000 ms. Trials ended with an inter-trial interval of 200 ms 
during which the screen was empty. On Probe trials, probe stimuli were 
presented instead of pictures. One probe was a target, >><<, the other 
a distractor, /\/\ or \/\/. The task was to indicate the location of the 
target by pressing the key associated with its location: R for top-left, F for 
bottom-left, J for bottom-right, and I for top-right. The fingers used were 
the index (bottom positions) and middle (top positions) finger of the left 
and right hands. Participants had a 1000 ms response window, which 
was ended by a response. Incorrect responses were followed by the text 
“Incorrect!” in red for 200 ms; if no response was provided in time the 
text “Too late!” was presented in the same way; accurate responses were 
followed by a 200 ms blank screen. 
The difference with previous studies with this task was the manip-
ulation of the probability of the target’s location relative to cue loca-
tions, which differed between even and odd blocks (randomized per 
participant). On one set of blocks, towards-threat blocks, there was a 
90% chance the target would appear at the location of the threat- 
predicting cue and 10% it would appear at the location of the non- 
threat-predicting cue. On the other set of blocks, away-from-threat, 
these probabilities were reversed. These probabilities were used to 
experimentally induce a task-related bias towards or away from threat, 
in addition to any automatic, task-unrelated bias involving threat. 
2.2.2. Questionnaires 
The 4-question Patient Health Questionnaire, PHQ4 (Kroenke et al., 
2009), was used to measure anxiety and depression symptoms. Cron-
bach’s alpha was 0.74 for anxiety and 0.74 for depression. Self-esteem 
was measured via the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, RSES (Rosenberg, 
1965). Cronbach’s alpha was 0.90. The Buss-Perry Aggression Ques-
tionnaire, BP (Buss & Perry, 1992), was used to measure Physical 
Aggression (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86), Verbal Aggression (0.83), Hos-
tility (0.86), and Anger (0.87). 
2.3. Procedure 
The experiment was performed online. Participants first completed 
the questionnaires, followed by two training runs of the predVPT (each 
two blocks of 48 trials) and then the assessment run of the predVPT (16 
blocks of 48 trials). Following each run, participants were given 
awareness checks in which they were asked which of the cues was fol-
lowed by the angry face. 
2.4. Preprocessing and statistical analysis 
During preprocessing of the assessment run used for analyses, the 
following trials were removed: The first four trials of the run, the first 
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trial per block, error trials, trials following an error, and trials with an RT 
more than 3 SD away from the mean of the experimental condition the 
trial was in. Of the remaining probe trials, the median RT per condition 
was used for further analyses. These preprocessing steps were the same 
as those used in recent similar studies on the predVPT (Gladwin, Banic, 
Figner, & Vink, 2019; Gladwin & Vink, 2020). 
The following analyses were performed for RT in Matlab (The 
Mathworks, 2015). Within-subject effects of block type (towards-threat 
and away-from-threat) and probe location (threat versus non-threat) 
were tested using the teg_RMA repeated measures ANOVA toolbox 
(Gladwin, 2020). These tests were also performed for accuracy. Split- 
half reliability was calculated using Spearman-Brown correction for 
the Spearman correlations between the bias on even and odd trials; bias 
was calculated per participant as the RT-difference between probe trials 
when the probe appeared at the threat minus the non-threat cue loca-
tion. This means that a more negative bias score represents a stronger 
attentional bias towards the threat-related location. The bias was 
calculated over all blocks and per block type, and additionally the 
contrast score (bias for towards-threat blocks) – (bias for away-from- 
threat blocks) was calculated. Spearman correlations were used to test 
associations between this set of bias measures and the set of self-report 
measures (anxiety, depression, self-esteem, physical aggression, verbal 
aggression, anger, and hostility). Multiple correction was performed 
over the tested correlations using permutation testing. This provided 
two approaches to controlling false positives. First, a permutation-based 
estimate was acquired of the p-value criterion needed for a familywise 
error rate of 5%. The set of bias scores were randomly permuted and 
then correlated with the set of self-report measures. For each of 25,000 
iterations, the smallest of the p-values of the correlations of the 
permuted data set was stored, leading to a null-hypothesis distribution 
of minimum p-values. The 5th percentile of these values was used as the 
p-criterion with familywise error correction, as fewer than 5% of 
random samples would have any test with a p-value below this value. 
Note that due to the exploitation of dependence between variables in the 
permutation procedure, this approach can result in less loss of power 
than Bonferroni correction. Second, using the same permutation pro-
cedure, we tested the significance of the number of nominally significant 
correlations (p < .05), as in previous work (Gladwin & Vink, 2018). This 
allows detection of effects at the level of the set of tests, trading off 
specificity for power: tests do not need to achieve very low p-values, but 
we cannot claim that any particular test achieved familywise corrected 
significance as with the permutation-based familywise error correction. 
3. Results 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. 
Significant within-subject effects on RT were found for probe loca-
tion, F(1, 142) = 10.15, p = .0018, eta_p^2 = 0.067, and for the inter-
action between probe location and block type, F(1, 142) = 52.65, p <
.0001, eta_p^2 = 0.27. The interaction reflects the experimental induc-
tion of a task-induced bias due to the likely target location on the current 
block. The main effect of probe location represented a bias towards the 
threat location (513 ms versus 523 ms) over both block types. 
The reliability of bias scores was high for the overall bias, 0.90. The 
reliability of the bias separated per block type was 0.59 for away-from- 
threat blocks and 0.73 for towards-threat blocks. The reliability of the 
contrast between the bias in the two block types was 0.50. The high 
reliability of 0.90 for the overall bias was explored further to check for 
effects of outliers (although the use of Spearman’s rather than Pearson 
correlation would have reduced their influence). On visual inspection a 
clear outlier was found with unusually large bias scores, but removal of 
this datapoint hardly changed the reliability, which become 0.89 
(Fig. 2). 
A list of all pairwise correlations between all variables is provided in 
Supplementary material. The permutation procedure provided a p-value 
criterion of 0.0086 for familywise error correction. Two correlations 
were significant at this level: the overall bias and anxiety, r = 0.23, p =
.0053, and the bias in away-from-threat blocks and anxiety, r = 0.25, p 
= .0024. The number of nominally significant tests was also significant; 
there were 4 significant tests, p = .0071, consisting of the two correla-
tions involving anxiety, and further those between the bias in away- 
from-threat blocks and depression, r = 0.21, p = .013, and the bias in 
away-from-threat blocks and self-esteem, r = − 0.18, p = .027. Taken 
together, the results suggest that increased anxiety, increased depres-
sion, and lower self-esteem were all related to a tendency to avoid up-
coming threat when this was in line with task-relevant contingencies; 
with the evidence being strongest for anxiety. 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics.  
A. Self-report measures 
Variable Mean (SD) 
Anxiety 3.66 (1.42) 
Depression 3.34 (1.34) 
Self-esteem 3.09 (0.547) 
Physical aggression 21.91 (9.54) 
Verbal aggression 17.34 (6.21) 
Anger 18.76 (7.87) 
Hostility 20.86 (9.24) 
Awareness check T1 0.60 
Awareness check T2 0.92 
Awareness check T3 0.96   
B. RT and accuracy on the predVPT  
Non-threat Threat  
Away Towards Away Towards 
RT  512  533  525  501 
Accuracy  0.96  0.94  0.95  0.97 
Note. Table 1A shows descriptive statistics for the scales of the self-report 
measures and the accuracy for the three awareness checks asking about which 
cue predicted the location of threat stimuli. Table 1B shows performance data 
for the predVPT task: the mean (over participants) of the median (over trials) RT 
and mean accuracy per condition. Non-threat and threat refer to whether the 
probe appeared at the location of a cue predicting non-threat or threat pictures. 
Away and Towards refer to block type: Is the experimentally induced task- 
related bias (based on the block’s probe-location probability) towards or away 
from the threat location? 
Fig. 2. Scatterplot of the even-uneven trial bias scores, after removal of one 
outlier. The split-half reliability was 0.89. 
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4. Discussion 
The current study used a version of the predVPT in which the rela-
tionship between an emotion-related attentional bias and a task-related 
attentional bias was manipulated. This was expected to improve reli-
ability by controlling the degree to which participants might direct 
attention in a voluntary way. Further, relationships with individual 
differences in mental health-related variables were explored. 
Reliability of the overall bias was high, increasing to 0.9 using the 
current version with improved experimental control of the task-related 
bias from the 0.7 previously found using the predVPT (Gladwin, 2019; 
Gladwin & Vink, 2020). Reliability for the bias when calculated sepa-
rately for sub-conditions was lower, which is as expected given the 
decrease in trial numbers; however, these were still in the 0.5–0.7 range 
and hence relatively high compared to the very low range reported for 
usual measures of spatial attentional bias. The current findings on 
overall bias in particular thus continue the improvement of reliability of 
the bias, due to attention to specific task features, in this case the 
experimental control of the task-relevant benefits to bias in one or the 
other direction. With the current reliability, the bias would be an 
adequate measure to use in individual differences research. Notably, this 
was found with online data collection, which may be important in a 
general pragmatic sense but also in terms of equality and inclusivity as 
not all researchers will have easy access to labs or eye-tracking 
equipment. 
The current results in fact included correlational effects. Using strict 
multiple testing correction, anxiety was associated with avoidance of the 
predicted threatening stimuli. This was found using the overall bias, but 
the effect was carried by the bias in blocks in which the task-related bias 
was congruent with this avoidance. It thus appears that, in the sampled 
population, the anxiety-related bias was obscured when the participant 
was using an incompatible task-relevant bias. Also within blocks with a 
task-relevant bias away from threat, trends were found for depression 
and self-esteem: depression and lower self-esteem, like anxiety, involved 
avoidance. While anxiety is often associated with vigilance towards 
threat, excessive avoidance of aversive stimuli has also been linked to 
mental health disorders (Dempsey et al., 2000; Lavy & van den Hout, 
1994; Maia, 2010; Mogg et al., 2004; Moukheiber et al., 2010). The 
avoidance of predicted, rather than already presented, threatening 
stimuli could, speculatively, reflect a possible coping strategy used by 
anxious individuals. In line with such a strategy, directing visual 
attention away from conflicting information downregulates its salience 
(Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2008) and reduces the startle effect (Singh 
et al., 2020). Thus, in terms of R3-defined automaticity, the bias involves 
selecting an attentional response that will reduce the impact of threat-
ening stimuli. This bias may be involved in anxiety, depression, and self- 
esteem, but to measure it appears to require the manipulation of the 
interaction between task-related and task-unrelated attentional biases. 
The current study only included awareness checks concerning the 
consistent cue-picture mapping, which indicated that subjects strongly 
tended to develop awareness (possibly partly due to the checks them-
selves). It is therefore not known whether participants were aware of the 
alternating cue-probe (or predicted picture-probe) mapping. Although 
this novel task feature appeared to improve psychometric properties and 
reveal relationships with individual differences, it is uncertain how it 
might have changed the task and processes underlying the bias relative 
to previous versions of the task with random probe locations. The 
average bias over alternating blocks is not equivalent to the bias over 
blocks with no such contingency at all; for example, alternating con-
tingencies may train participants to attend to contingencies and pre-
dictive stimuli (Gladwin, 2017). While the current rationale focused on 
the control of task-relevant, probe-related attentional influences, future 
research is needed to test hypotheses on potential mechanisms under-
lying the effect of this task factor. Relevant processes could include, for 
instance, whether conflict was evoked between the “top-down” and 
“bottom-up” influences on attention (i.e., the predictions of emotional 
pictures and of task-relevant probes and their use in response selection 
mechanisms), which could have influenced conflict monitoring pro-
cesses relevant to effects of emotional stimuli (Bishop, 2009; Botvinick 
et al., 1999); differences between individuals’ ability to use task- 
relevant predictive cues in the different block contexts; or differences 
related to the downregulation or inhibition of the influence of emotional 
stimuli (Oei et al., 2009). 
Other limitations of the study include the convenience sample. 
Especially given the good reliability and promising correlational re-
lationships, it would appear worth investing in studies using the 
predVPT in samples focusing on particular mental health issues in future 
research. Clear confirmatory hypotheses could be used based on the 
current results on anxiety, depression, and self-esteem. Another limita-
tion was the online data collections. However, it has been found that 
data collected online do not show extreme differences from those 
collected in the lab (Chetverikov & Upravitelev, 2016; Gosling & Mason, 
2015; van Ballegooijen et al., 2016). It is perhaps worth noting that 
participant behaviour in the lab is also not always ideal, and the lab itself 
is an abnormal setting. Together with considerations of pragmatism, we 
would suggest that online data collection and behavioural measures are 
a valid part of a broad, coherent approach to data collection which 
should of course also include laboratory measurements and, e.g., eye 
tracking or physiological methods. Future research is also needed to 
assess test-retest reliability over multiple sessions, as psychological test- 
retest effects may lead to divergent results from the current assessment 
of split-half reliability. There are also many potential variations of the 
task, in particular the stimuli and stimulus categories and the duration of 
trial intervals. While the current task produced good results, future 
research is needed to expand knowledge of the biases found elsewhere in 
the feature space of the task. In particular temporal dynamics, and hence 
trials or blocks with varying Cue-Probe Intervals, are of interest from the 
R3 perspective. Finally, we note that the relationship is uncertain be-
tween effects found using the current task and the usual dot-probe task, 
and more broadly with other variations or alternative tasks (Grafton 
et al., 2021; Heitmann et al., 2021). Performance-related measures 
derived from broadly similar tasks do not necessarily reflect the same 
processes or biases, and generally have multiple potential explanations. 
For instance, effects on a given task may be due to an ability to disengage 
spatial visual attention from a salient stimulus, while on another task 
effects may be due to predictive processing driving attentional shifts. 
Research aimed at such comparisons will hopefully provide rich 
empirical information helpful for theoretical progress, but this will in 
any case require solid methodological foundations. 
In conclusion, high reliability of anticipatory spatial attentional bias 
to threat was found when task-related attentional bias was controlled. 
Anxiety, and to a lesser extent depression and low self-esteem, were 
associated with a tendency to avoid predicted threatening stimuli. The 
results confirm and extend results demonstrating that high reliability of 
an implicit measure of spatial attentional bias can be achieved via online 
behavioural data collection, although this requires adjustments of 
traditional tasks and theoretical rationales. 
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi. 
org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2021.103357. 
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